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I.
According to a person-affecting view, it can be said that I cause you harm through my action X, if – as a consequence of this action – I make you worse off than you were before I performed X – let’s call it 
the basic harm claim. This is a very simple and intuitive idea on which, I believe, 
the great majority of us would agree.1 However, many further specifications 
can be added to the short formulation I have just drawn out, so as to uncover 
the different ethical positions that people might have with regards to the no-
1 See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 370. For a 
purely deontological conception of harm, which does not rely on the person-affecting view, see 
Rahul Kumar, “Who Can Be Wronged?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, no. 2 (2003): 99-118.
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tion of harm. It might be added, for example, that I am not blameworthy for 
causing you harm if I had no other choice, or if any other choice I had was much 
worse than the harm I could have decided to cause to you as an alternative.2 
Consider the case in which I lose control of my car because of a mechanical 
problem that I could not foresee and for which I am not responsible, so that I 
end up in your garden and wreck your flowers. I have surely caused you harm, 
hence I owe you compensation, but am I also to blame for what I have done? 
Some people might say no, I have nothing to regret, because I was given no 
choice. Some others, instead, might contend that even though the car was out 
of my control, I should feel a sort of ‘agent-regret’ for the reason of taking 
part – although I was not given the chance of doing otherwise – to the chain 
of actions that have led to the premature death of your flowers.3
The same discourse holds true for the situation in which I happen to step 
on your flowers in the attempt to escape from someone who wants to stab 
me, on condition that entering your property is the only realistic way for me 
to save my life. Here, differently from the previous situation, I have an alter-
native – letting my killer accomplish his mission. But this alternative would 
entail such a severe loss for me – my life – that it cannot be compared to the 
trivial loss I instead decide to impose on you – your flowers. So even here we 
can either believe that I am not to blame or rather that I should feel agent-re-
gret – remaining constant my duty of compensation toward you. Nonethe-
less, it is important to stress that a theoretical difference exists between those 
cases in which I act unfreely and those in which I am forced to do something. 
For in the latter – as the stabbing case – the moral absolution of the agent 
that causes harm, by those who exclude agent-regret, is not a given, rather 
it depends on two elements that are strictly interconnected: the likelihood 
that the decision of agent A of causing harm to agent B might save agent A 
from a more prominent harm and the difference in severity between the harm 
suffered by agent A and agent B. In a few words, if I might be blameworthy 
for trying to save my life at the cost of you losing your flowers, I might be 
less justified in doing it if the cost for you is the loss of your entire property 
– knowing that I cannot compensate you for that –, and I become less and 
less justified the higher your cost – think for example of the loss of mobility.
Secondly, we might add the further specification that both awareness 
and causal proximity matter in the allocation of moral blame and of com-
2 On the difference between being forced to do something and doing something unfreely see 
also Gerald A. Cohen, History, Labour, and Freedom: Themes from Marx (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988), 241-244. 
3 See Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 20-39; and, also, Stephen de Wijze, “Tragic-Remorse: The Anguish of 
Dirty Hands,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7, no. 5 (2005): 461-463.
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pensatory duties related to harm. Consider, for example, the case in which I 
put some money in an investment fund, and it turns out that my savings have 
been used for financing a company that buys semi-laboured products from 
another company that recruits workers in slave-like conditions in a devel-
oping country. Am I blameworthy for this? Do I owe compensation to these 
workers? There is no clear answer, I believe. Much depends on the degree 
of awareness that could have been expected from me at the moment of the 
investment. If we assume that finding out the reproachable use that the fund 
made of my money would have taken days of study and investigation, we 
might probably conclude that I was not blameworthy for the recruitment of 
quasi-enslaved workers,4 while leaving open the issue of compensation. The 
latter dilemma could probably be unravelled, at least partially, by looking 
at causal proximity. Taking as a given that those people kept at work at un-
fair conditions through violence and deception have suffered harm, we could 
propose a model of responsibility - that might seem reasonable - according 
to which compensatory duties extend throughout the whole causal chain in 
a decreasing way. Therefore, those who are more proximate to the action 
that causes harm – in our case the local employer – have the largest share of 
compensatory duties and blame. The second largest share goes to those just 
below the direct performers of harm, the third largest share belongs to those 
one step further back, and so on. 
We could cut the chain of responsibility for a given harm at the point in 
which it becomes unreasonable to expect that an agent could – and should 
– be aware that her action will nestle into a sequence of actions that result 
in that specific harm. In our example, this point is represented by the action 
through which I entrust my savings to the investment fund, because at this 
stage it is still disputable whether I could be held responsible for not being 
aware of the causal relation that links my action to the final harm. Instead, it 
would be unreasonable, from a moral point of view, to extend this responsi-
bility beyond my investment, to the person – be it my employer or my grand-
mother – who gave me the money I later decided to give to the fund. For 
this person – were she paying me or making me a gift – could in no way had 
imagined that I would have spent my money in an investment with a fund that 
would have later given credit to a company that would have decided to buy 
semi-laboured products from a supplier that violates the freedom of a group 
of employees living in a distant place. In other words, we might say that 
4 Yet, an objection might be that if I do not have the intellectual tools or sufficient available 
information for understanding how my money will be used, I shall not venture in complex 
investments. The counter-objection, however, can be that if I lack the knowledge about the 
complexity of investment funds and of world economy and foreign politics, I might not be 
aware of the fact that the action I am undertaking is beyond my cognitive reach. 
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with relation to a given harm, both the moral blame and the responsibility to 
compensate cannot go beyond the action that causes the last unpredictable 
deviation in the infinite causal sequence that leads to that harm.
However, and here we come to the third point, the formulation of re-
sponsibility for harm that we proposed above can suffice only if we remain at 
an interactional level, that is to say if we are only interested in looking at the 
actions performed by single individuals. Conversely, in the case I also want to 
take into consideration the forms of harm caused by social structures – as we 
think we should –, we could extend the responsibility for harm much beyond 
the last unpredictable deviation in the sequence of individual actions from 
which the harm stems. This is so because each agent operates within a set of 
rules and norms that constrain individual choices and condition the distribu-
tion of social and economic resources.5 And this set of rules and norms – that 
for simplicity we can call social structures - can either be just or unjust,6 
depending obviously on which paradigm of justice we adopt. Therefore, if 
those agents that take part to the sequence of harm are constrained in their 
choices by the social structure – be it national or global – in which they act, 
the discourse on responsibility for harm can be extended to those who “[…] 
contribute to a greater or lesser degree to the production and reproduction 
of structural injustice precisely because […] they […] follow the accepted and 
expected rules and conventions of the communities and institutions in which 
[…] they […] act.”7 
In order to clarify this point, imagine a slightly modification of our ex-
ample – or a specification, if you prefer – according to which the company 
that practices violence and exploitation over employees operates in a coun-
try in which the national government has implemented a political program 
of deregulation aimed at attracting foreign investments and that consists in 
the reduction of workers’ rights and in the informal mandate to controllers 
to ignore pale cases of exploitation. Accordingly, the result is a race to the 
bottom for employers to remain in the business. Thus, we have a case in which 
the final action by the agents who do harm is undertaken within a background 
situation in which the set of alternative options to harm has been severe-
ly constrained by systemic socio-economic conditions. The latter have been 
brought about by a political decision for which all those who took part to 
5 See Andrea Sangiovanni, “Structural Injustice and Individual Responsibility,” Journal of Social 
Philosophy 49, no. 3 (2018): 462; Lea Ypi, “Structural Injustice and the Place of Attachment,” 
Journal of Practical Ethics 5, no. 1 (2017): 9.
6 See Iris Marion Young, “Responsibility and Global Labor Justice,” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 12, no. 4 (2004): 365-388.
7 Ibid., 378.
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the democratic process can be held responsible8 – with different degrees of 
responsibility depending on the political support they have provided. 
Nonetheless, people living in the country where exploitation occurs 
might defend the political strategy of their government arguing that it had 
no choice, because had it kept in place the old guarantees for workers and had 
it not created a friendly and low-tax business environment, foreign investors 
would have brought their capital to another place. Accordingly, following 
this argument, we could even maintain that the responsibility for the harm 
suffered by the exploited workers we are discussing should be broadened to 
the global order, and hence to those agents that have a substantial influence 
in shaping its rules.9 
Fourthly, the notion of harm can be interpreted either in a diachronic 
sense or in relation to a ‘moralised subjunctive baseline.’10 From a diachronic 
point of view I do make you harm through my action X if I cause you to be 
worse off than you were in a historical moment that precedes my performance 
of X. Conversely, from the perspective of the ‘subjunctive moral baseline’ I do 
make you harm through my action X if I cause you to be worse off than you 
would be in a hypothetical situation in which a given account of justice – that 
is measured by the baseline – has been respected. This account can either be 
a very restrictive one, as for example an account merely based on fundamen-
tal human rights, or it can require in addition some positive socio-economic 
provisions of distributive justice – as for example basic capabilities, a con-
tentment-based or an objective sufficiency threshold, and so on. As a result, 
the ‘subjunctive moral baseline’ need not necessarily be solely hypothetical, 
because it can also correspond to an earlier historical moment – although his-
toricity is not a necessary requirement for the moral validity of the baseline.
To make things clearer, consider the case of a person who, while con-
ducting a normal life, gets kidnapped and enslaved. The slaveholder treats 
his new slave very badly for some months; then he decides to sell him to 
another slaveholder that is as cruel as the previous one. This slave-exchange 
takes place several times, with successive slaveholders being almost as rotten 
toward the slave as the previous one. While at a certain point the slave gets 
sold to a new slaveholder that is much more compassionate. This master lets 
the slave conduct an enjoyable life within the house for many years, treating 
8 See also how I. M. Young applies her ‘social connection model’ of responsibility to the 
sweatshop case in Iris Marion Young, “Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection 
Model,” Social Philosophy and Policy 23, no. 1 (2006): 102-130; and the definition of ‘systemic 
coercion’ given in Laura Valentini, “Coercion and (Global) Justice,” American Political Science 
Review 105, no. 1 (2011): 212-214.
9 See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the 
Welfare State,” Harvard Law Review 113, no. 7 (2000): 1573-1676.
10 Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 25.
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him as one of his sons, but never letting him get outside. Is this compassion-
ate slaveholder harming his slave? In a purely diachronic sense, the answer is 
that it depends on which historical moment we adopt as a baseline. If we look 
at the previous enslavement, or at the ones before, up to the first enslave-
ment, we should conclude that the last master is not harming the slave but 
rather is benefiting him. Conversely, if we take the slave’s previous condition 
as free human being as our comparative baseline – as I think we should – we 
can conclude that also from a diachronic prospective the compassionate mas-
ter is harming his slave. 
However, imagine a slightly different variation of our example, in which 
the slave has never been kidnapped, rather he has inherited this condition from 
his parents. In this situation, we cannot argue that the compassionate master 
is harming the slave in a diachronic sense, because we simply lack a historical 
point of reference with respect to which the current situation of the slave can 
be judged as worse off. The only way out of this moral impasse consists in 
appealing to a subjunctive interpretation of harm, that in our case can also be 
based on a very thick conception of fundamental human rights. Accordingly, 
from this theoretical perspective, we can argue that the slave keeps on being 
harmed while living in the house of the compassionate master, as long as he 
is prevented from the conjunctive exercise of all his fundamental liberties, 
independently of whether he has ever had the chance of doing it before.
Nonetheless, I also agree with Lukas Meyer when he underlines that a 
notion of harm that is simply based on a subjunctive interpretation would run 
the risk of being too under-inclusive. For if we altogether drop the diachronic 
interpretation, how would we sanction all those forms of harm that do not 
cause the victims to fall below the moral baseline? Think, for example, of 
minor robberies suffered by wealthy people. Therefore, I think that Meyer is 
entirely right in proposing what he calls a ‘combined view,’ in which both the 
diachronic and the subjunctive interpretations are sufficient but not necessary 
for defining harm.11
In short, I sought to argue so far that, within a person-affective view, the 
basic harm claim is the theoretical foundation on which all the further spec-
ifications that characterise the different moral positions on harm have been 
nested. Alternatively, the person-affective view of harm cannot prescind from 
the straightforward principle that in order to harm you through an action of 
mine, I have to make you worse off in some respects. There are, however, two 
further issues that I want to briefly discuss in this short article. The first issue 
is how through the distinction between the diachronic and the subjunctive 
11 Lukas H. Meyer, “Past and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm,” in Rights, Culture 
and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz, eds. Lukas H. Meyer, 
Stanley L. Paulson, and Thomas W. Pogge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 154-155.
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dimension of harm, we can challenge and resist the argument, advanced also 
by some progressive thinkers, that some realities, as those of the sweatshops, 
that would be unacceptable in developed countries, are helping rather than 
harming people living in developing countries, because they offer an opportu-
nity to foster productivity and ultimately to stimulate growth. 
The second issue is at which point of the chain of actions that lead to a 
given harm we should interrupt the line of responsibility. In fact, if we stretch 
the notion of harm in both the subjunctive and the structural directions, we 
end up with an account that risks being excessively over-demanding, espe-
cially in virtue of the fact that it is almost impossible – or at least extremely 
difficult – to disentangle ourselves from the harm caused by the social struc-
tures of which we are part. The consequences are relevant, because also in 
our role as simple consumers, we might be continuously part of the chain of 
actions that lead to injustice and at the same time reinforce the legitimacy 
of this chain, keeping into consideration both the liability and the structural 
model of responsibility.12 
II.
I shall start with the first issue. In a famous op-ed that was written for Slate in 
1997, the Keynesian economist Paul Krugman held that even though sweatshops 
in themselves are awful places to work in, they represent a big improvement with 
respect to the widespread poverty that characterised developing countries before 
foreign investments fostered these labour-intensive activities, and at the same 
time sweatshops can be an opportunity to achieve economic growth.13 More gen-
erally, sweatshops represent the way in which people from developing countries 
can make their labour productive, relying on technology that is transferred from 
developed countries.14 A similar point has also been made, among the others, by 
Oliver Riley on the website of the free-marketer Adam Smith Society. He argued 
that sweatshops are helping rather than harming the poor, because they lead to 
12 See also Fausto Corvino, and Alberto Pirni, “Discharging the Moral Responsibility for 
Collective Unjust Enrichment in the Global Economy,” THEORIA: An International Journal for 
Theory, History and Foundations of Science (2020): 1-23.
13 Paul Krugman, “In Praise of Cheap Labor: Bad jobs at bad wages are better than no jobs at 
all,” Slate, March 21, 1997, https://slate.com/business/1997/03/in-praise-of-cheap-labor.html. 
See also Paul Krugman, The Accidental Theorist: And Other Dispatches from the Dismal Science 
(New York: W. W. Northon & Company, 1998), 71-96.
14 In a previous op-ed article written for the New York Times, Krugman aroused a great deal 
of stir, writing that: “The rapidly expanding exports of newly industrializing economies have 
put pressure on less-skilled workers in advanced countries even as they offer unprecedented 
opportunities to tens of millions in the third world. (The wages of those workers are shockingly 
low but nonetheless represent a vast improvement on their previous, less visible rural poverty.),” 
Paul Krugman, “We Are Not the World,” The New York Times, February 13, 1997, https://www.
nytimes.com/1997/02/13/opinion/we-are-not-the-world.html. 
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economic growth, they represent a valid alternative to other forms of employ-
ment that are available in developing countries (and he insists explicitly on the 
positive effects they have on women), which is demonstrated by the fact that 
these jobs are freely chosen, and they can also increase public revenues, through 
taxes, hence providing more resources to invest in human development.15 
Despite the fact that this kind of comments has the effect of arousing 
indignation, I think that they are empirically correct. What is wrong, though, 
is to try to derive moral conclusions from empirical arguments that only look 
at the temporal dimension of harm, renouncing any moral premise.16 As in the 
example of the slaves that I was analysing in the previous section, there is no 
doubt that the benevolent master who treats his new slave in a less harsh way 
than the former slaveholder cannot be said to harm him in diachronic sense, at 
least from a person-affecting view, because the slave is now better off than he 
was before. But the benevolent slaveholder is surely harming the slave in an 
overall perspective, that is to say, taking into account not only how bad the 
slave was before but also what are the minimal conditions for a person to lead 
an acceptable life. Obviously, everything would hinge upon what we mean by 
an acceptable life, but I guess we would not have many problems in agreeing 
that a necessary condition for a life to be considered as acceptable is to be 
guaranteed basic individual rights. 
The same discourse holds true for sweatshops. The so-called Asian Tigers, 
that is to say Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong underwent rapid 
industrialisation starting from the 1960s, moving from being among the poor-
est countries in the world to the richest ones. Much of the success of these 
economies can be explained by the fact that they initially offered cheap labour 
and a flexible labour environment to transnational corporations. Then, when 
GDP started growing and with it also wages, labour intensive activities were 
moved to poorer countries, while the four tigers have specialised in advanced 
technologies and financial services.17 It is thus true that sweatshops are a valid 
alternative to many other job opportunities that exist in developing countries, 
and we should not even be surprised if, placed in front of the question whether 
to close or to keep open sweatshops, many exploited workers would say that 
they should remain open.
Therefore, the right question to ask is not – or at least not exclusively – 
whether sweatshops are better than other jobs, but instead if a company that 
15 Oliver Riley, “How Sweatshops Help the Poor,” Adam Smith Institute, March 20, 2017, 
https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/how-sweatshops-help-the-poor. 
16 See also Fausto Corvino, Global Justice, Markets and Domination: A Cosmopolitan Theory 
(Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2020), 110-112.
17 See William Gumede, Radical Economic Transformation: Lessons from the East Asian Tigers 
(Cape Town: Penguin Random House South Africa, 2019).
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commercialises a final product for 100 dollars is harming the worker who realises 
this product by paying him only few cents per hour – assuming also that in one 
hour the worker finalises more than one product – and these few cents, and more 
generally the working conditions at the workplace, prevent him from fulfilling 
his basic human rights. Some people respond that no harm is occurring if market 
contingencies, and in particular the unbridled competition in the manufacturing 
sector, prevent the employer – or more generally the employers, taking into ac-
count all the subcontracting passages that we were discussing before – from of-
fering a different contract. This kind of counter-arguments does not necessarily 
deny the validity of the subjunctive interpretation of harm as an integration of the 
diachronic one, but rather seeks to demonstrate that although a better subjunc-
tive account is preferable in theory, it is unfeasible in practice: hence, it does not 
make sense to assess harm in relation to a moral account that is not historical. In 
the same way as if there were a person who was going to die and the only way 
for you to intervene and save him is to cause him great pain. From a moral point 
of view, we could say that this person enjoys the fundamental right to bodily 
integrity and everything that violates this right harms him, yet if in this situation 
you choose to bring him pain, it is unreasonable to say that you are harming him 
– actually many people would say that you are helping him.
In our case, local employers may say that given the price that the company 
is willing to pay, the only way to carry out the work is to substantially reduce 
labour costs. On the other hand, the company might counterargue that in light 
of the market needs expressed by the multinational corporation, there is no alter-
native to cheap sub-contracting. Moreover, the multinational corporation may 
add that the struggle between brands to win market shares obliges it to keep the 
price of the shoes close to the other brands, hence there is no room for better 
working conditions.
Honestly, this sort of inverse chain of passing the buck risks justifying a mor-
al deadlock in which every economic actor is stuck in a prisoner’s dilemma, which 
could be solvable through cooperation, yet none has an incentive to run the risk 
of proposing a collective change. In fact, given the disproportion between wages 
and final prices in the retail sector, and also the logo effect, that is to say the 
fact that brands usually multiply what is the ‘real’ value of items (i.e., how much 
it costs to produce these items),18 if those corporations that control the largest 
share of the market for football shoes agreed on a joint commitment for paying 
a more acceptable wage to those persons who work or refine the final product, 
we might assume that the impact on price would be limited, and therefore total 
sales in the sector would not fall.19 
18 See Naomi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies (New York: Knopf, 1999).
19 See also Paul Krugman, “Safer Sweatshops,” The New York Times, July 8, 2003, https://
krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/08/safer-sweatshops/?campaignId=7JFJX. 
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Under these contingencies, that in my view reflect the reality, we can 
maintain that sweatshops do not cause harm diachronically, and we can even 
bite the bullet launched by Benjamin Powell and David B. Skarbek, who main-
tain that sweatshops pay higher wages than other employers and hence are 
in some respects good,20 without renouncing the idea that sweatshops harm 
the poor tout court, in relation to a hypothetical job contract that could be 
achieved without the employers incurring in substantial losses and guarantee-
ing the employees basic human rights. Moreover, the fact that employers may 
get stuck in a prisoner’s dilemma does not mitigate their responsibility for the 
harm suffered in sweatshops, at least as long as a collective solution can be 
obtained without market setbacks.21
III.
I would thus move on to the second issue I consider important for operation-
alising a comprehensive model of responsibility: to which extent an individual 
can be considered, from a moral point of view, as causally bounded to a given 
harm, in a world in which we are both interconnected and mutually vulnerable 
to decisions taken from individuals that are geographically far from our lives. 
Some philosophers believe that the paradigm of structural injustice suffices 
to sustain moral responsibility quite far in the chain of actions leading to in-
justice. Thus, following the famous ‘social connection model’ of Iris Marion 
Young,22 we might say that if John buys a pair of football sneakers in Berlin, 
and it happens that the multinational corporation that has commercialised the 
shoes has entrusted the processing of the semi-finished product to a company 
that has subcontracted the work to local employers in Malaysia who in turn 
have exploited poor local workers, imposing on them unsafe and indecent 
working conditions, then John shares a part of the responsibility for the harm 
suffered by the people who have worked on his brand-new football shoes. 
Obviously neither Young nor other thinkers who embrace something like the 
‘social-connection model’ would maintain that John is culpable on the liabili-
ty model for the harm suffered by the local workers,23 yet they would say that 
by buying those shoes instead of other ones, John is contributing to keeping 
in place a structural dynamic of injustice - notwithstanding the fact that the 
action performed by John, buying a specific pair of shoes because they look 
20 Benjamin Powell, and David Skarbek, “Sweatshops and Third World Living Standards: Are the 
Jobs Worth the Sweat?” Journal of Labor Research 27, no. 2 (2006): 263-274.
21 See also Fausto Corvino, “Punishing Atypical Dirty Hands: Assessing the Moral Value of 
Coordination Failure,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 29, no. 2 (2015): 281-297. 
22 See also the more recent Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011).
23 For a critical analysis of this type of conclusions see also Sangiovanni, 465-469.
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nice or are cheap or whatever other reason, cannot be said to be morally 
wrong in itself. And this marks the difference between the contribution of 
John and the contribution of the local employers to the harm suffered by ex-
ploited workers, because the employers are the penultimate tiers of the chain 
of actions that lead to injustice - in other words, they are those who carry 
out the action that is morally wrong per se, that is to say exploiting someone. 
However, let us consider now a second case, which also takes up a situa-
tion described in the first section. Chris has saved up some money and wants 
to invest it to make some profits. He goes to the bank and confides in a 
financial promoter, who promises him a good profit at a medium/low risk. 
Chris accepts, so the promoter contacts an international fund and invests the 
money that Chris has entrusted to him. The international fund continuously 
purchases and sales shares of a huge number of companies, among which 
there is also the multinational corporation that sold the football shoes to 
John. Accordingly, it turns out that in the stock packages in which Chris has 
invested his money, through the promoter, there are also the shares of this 
corporation. Lastly, consider this third case. Julia, who is John’s grandmother, 
knows that her grandson needs new football shoes; hence she gives him 100 
dollars to buy a brand-new pair. John happily accepts the money and buys the 
shoes produced by the multinational in question.
Both John, Chris, and Julia are one of the connecting rings of the chain 
of actions that bring harm to poor workers in Malaysia. More precisely they 
occupy a place on two different branches that are connected to the chain 
through the same ring, namely the multinational corporation. The first branch 
is the following: W, Y, Z24… Julia, John, multinational corporation … exploit-
ed workers. The second branch is: A, B, C25… Chris, multinational corporation 
… exploited workers. The normative challenge consists in assessing at which 
ring the responsibility fades away and leaves place to a causal involvement 
that is morally indefinite. Those who simply recur to a liability model believe 
that the turning point that interrupts responsibility lies somewhere between 
the multinational corporations and the last ring before exploited workers. 
Obviously, much would hinge upon to what extent every intermediate actor 
intentionally decides to enter into connection with the adjacent actor for 
the purpose of arriving at the final harm. That is to say, if the multinational 
corporation sets the clear objective of exploiting workers and for doing this 
relies on a series of intermediate figures, either for preserving its public image 
or because this is the easiest way, then it would hardly escape its liability, at 
least from a moral point of view – while it would be different if the corpora-
24 Z, for example, can be the state paying Julia her pension.
25 A, B and C can be Chris’s employer, the uncle who left him an inheritance, the poker player 
Chris won money from, and so on.
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tion simply got grafted on the chain of actions that we are analysing because 
it has scented the way to cut costs without knowing and therefore without 
being interested in what means the next actors will use. 
Conversely, those who embrace the structural model would say that 
responsibility goes beyond the multinational corporation, and it can either 
supplement liability – thus attributing a double responsibility to the last rings 
of the chain – or replace it – as it happens when even the local contrac-
tors manage to demonstrate that, given the current market contingencies, 
they were unable to offer better contract conditions. The complication with 
structural responsibility, in comparison with liability, is to identify its turning 
point. As I was suggesting in the first section, one possibility for avoiding the 
indefinite transmission of the structural responsibility consists in assessing at 
which point the effort (in terms of time and energy) that is required to the 
actor to understand where the money she disposes of will end up (through-
out the chain of actions it contributes to fuel) turns out to be unreasonably 
burdensome. Can we expect John to know that his shoes have been realised in 
sweatshops? Obviously, we cannot request John to embark on investigative 
journalism before entering a store. Thus, the assessment of John’s responsi-
bility would seem to depend on the availability of reliable information ma-
terial concerning the supply chain of the multinational corporation. It would 
follow that the responsibility for a given harm fades out at the point in which 
those actors that are causally involved in that harm cannot any longer fore-
see it through a standard media consultation: i.e., not by investigating on the 
ethical status of every single product they consume, but by keeping informed 
about social, political and economic affairs. 
The latter can be adopted as a reliable method for measuring the scope 
of responsibility, and at the same time it introduces a moral sub-duty for eco-
nomic agents operating within global capitalism, i.e. the duty to be averagely 
informed about both what happens around them and in the world. In more 
practical terms, the duty to be informed is fulfilled by watching the news, 
reading newspapers and generalist magazines, and engaging in public discus-
sion with people around us. Therefore, we might say that for a person to be 
held morally responsible for a given harm to which she is connected through 
a chain of causal actions, and hence subject either to a restorative duty or 
to a duty to take part to a reformative action (be it individual or collective) 
which aims to eliminate the source of harm,26 two alternative (or conjunctive) 
conditions should hold: i) the individual is responsible on the liability model 
for the harm [and/or] ii) the individual is in the position to know about the 
harm through a reasonable effort (in other words, the harm can be known by 
fulfilling the duty to be informed that we were discussing just above) and she 
26 See Young, Responsibility for Justice, 95-170. 
[ 21 ]
CONATUS • JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME 5, ISSUE 2 • 2020
is in the position to understand and foresee all the passages of the chain of 
actions that lead to harm. 
By using this operational specification of the structural model of respon-
sibility, we can maintain that if the fact that the multinational corporation, 
in the case we were examining, relies on sweatshops is generally known, be-
cause it has been ascertained by journalists, NGOs, international organisations, 
then John is responsible for the harm suffered by exploited workers, because 
he indirectly contributes to sustaining the social structures that lead to this 
harm, while being in a position to avoid it. Conversely, Julia is not responsible 
for harm, because even though she is also in the position to know how the 
multinational corporation operates, we cannot expect her to foresee in which 
shop John will use the money he has received. Obviously, this kind of assertion 
is open to discussion. Someone might want to say that when John asks Julia 
money for the shoes, Julia has the moral duty to put conditions to John, of 
the kind: “I give you the money, provided that you are not going to spend it 
in the following shops…” If you hold this position, I think we may agree that 
Julia’s responsibility is questionable only in so far as John makes clear to her 
that he needs money for a specific purpose, but Julia can never be held morally 
responsible for the money she gives to her grandchild without knowing how, 
when and if he is going to spend it. Lastly, Chris’s situation lies in the middle, 
and in his case, everything depends on how difficult it is for him to comprehend 
that his financial promoter is going to invest on ‘dirty’ shares. I would tend to 
say that the fact that Chris’s action aims at obtaining profits by taking part in 
the global financial market brings with itself an additional duty of prudence, 
which demands Chris to make a greater effort to understand the functioning of 
the global market and the way in which the intermediaries he relies on operate. 
Accordingly, in my view Chris’s case is closer to John than to Julia.
IV. Conclusions
In this short article, I sought to develop some practical criteria for assess-
ing how far moral responsibility for harm extends along the chain of actions 
leading to it. I shall now summarise my findings in the following way. An 
individual can be said to be responsible for a given harm as long as: (i) the 
individual is the one (or member of the group) who performs the last action 
leading to harm (hence she is liable for the harm), [and/or] (ii) the individual 
performs one of the actions that, put in sequence, lead to harm and she is in 
the position both to know about the existence of harm, through a reasonable 
epistemological effort, and to understand and foresee all the passages of the 
chain of actions that lead to harm, [and] (iii) the harm can be interpreted – at 
least – as subtraction from a subjunctive baseline – no matter whether this 
baseline does also find an historical correspondence. 
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